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LIFE AFTER DOMA 
MARK STRASSER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 2008 presidential campaign, President Obama outlined his 
position on same-sex relationships. While making clear that he does not support 
same-sex marriage, he nonetheless suggested both that same-sex married 
couples should receive all of the benefits that different-sex married couples 
receive and that the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)1 should be 
repealed. Further, in separate orders, two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
judges—one liberal and the other conservative—each recently suggested that 
one provision of the Defense of Marriage Act violated constitutional 
guarantees.2 DOMA’s days may well be numbered, whether as a result of its 
being struck down or repealed. Given that distinct possibility, the legal 
ramifications of a repeal or invalidation of either of DOMA’s provisions should 
be discussed. 
The Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) has two provisions. One 
makes clear that states are not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in other states, and the other 
defines marriage for federal purposes as the union of one man and one woman. 
The two provisions are designed to do different things, and Congress could 
repeal one without repealing the other. By the same token, a court could strike 
down one of the provisions without addressing the constitutionality of the 
other. 
To understand the effect of the repeal or invalidation of one or both DOMA 
provisions, it is necessary to understand what each does. While there is little or 
no dispute about some of the implications of the DOMA provisions, the Act was 
not drafted with as much care as might have been desired,3 and there are certain 
ambiguities that have not been clarified by the courts. 
Some possible interpretations and implications of the ambiguous 
provisions are included below. Ironically, on some interpretations of DOMA, the 
repeal or invalidation of the Act will have little or no effect on the power of 
states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated elsewhere, 
although on other interpretations the repeal or invalidation of DOMA would 
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 1. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 2. See In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2009) (Chief Judge Alex Kozinski); See In re 
Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2009) (Judge Stephen Reinhardt). 
 3. Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of 
Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 182 (1998) (discussing “DOMA’s rather 
awkward phraseology”). 
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have important effects. What is clear, however, is that the repeal or invalidation 
of one provision of DOMA will have important ramifications for some same-sex 
couples, and the repeal or invalidation of the other provision will have 
important implications for some of the state Defense of Marriage Acts that have 
been passed. 
Part II of this essay discusses the two DOMA provisions, including what 
they may mean and some of the ways that they are constitutionally vulnerable. 
Part III discusses some of the effects and non-effects of the repeal or invalidation 
of either DOMA provision. The essay concludes that while many of the 
exaggerated claims of members of Congress about the need for DOMA will be 
laid to rest as groundless, the repeal or invalidation of DOMA will benefit LGBT 
families and society as a whole in a number of tangible and intangible ways. 
II. DOMA 
The Defense of Marriage Act has one provision ostensibly affecting full 
faith and credit guarantees and another provision defining marriage for federal 
purposes. While the latter provision’s meaning and reach seem relatively 
straightforward, the same cannot be said of the former, which is ambiguous in a 
very significant way. Each provision is constitutionally vulnerable, sometimes 
for the same reason and sometimes for different reasons, which provides 
support for the prediction that one or both will be repealed or struck down in 
the not-too-distant future. 
A. Why Was the Defense of Marriage Act Passed? 
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court decided Baehr v. Lewin,4 which involved 
a challenge to the state’s same-sex marriage ban. Rather than simply strike down 
the restriction, the court instead made clear that the ban should be examined in 
light of the strictest standard under the Hawaii Constitution, and then 
remanded the case for evaluation in light of that standard.5 
Many who read the Baehr decision understood that the standard in light of 
which the ban would be examined by the lower court was so strict that it would 
be almost impossible for the state to defend the marriage ban successfully.6 
Absent an amendment to the state constitution or some other compromise,7 the 
 
 4. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 5. Id. at 68 (“On remand, in accordance with the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard, the burden will rest 
on Lewin to overcome the presumption that HRS § 572-1 is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it 
furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of 
constitutional rights.”). 
 6. See John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 51 HOW. L.J. 15, 
28 (2007) (“[T]he Hawaii court concluded that the ban on same-sex marriage constituted a sex-based 
classification. This doomed it to almost certain invalidation since such classifications are reviewed 
with strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution.”); Jonathan Deitrich, Comment, The Lessons of the 
Law: Same-Sex Marriage and Baehr v. Lewin, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 121, 125 (1994) (“Since very few 
statutes can meet this standard, it is believed that Hawaii may become the first state to recognize 
same-sex marriages.”). 
 7. Cf. Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don’t Ask; If It Is, Don’t Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and 
the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 458 n.462 (1995) (“[A] political compromise may be adopted 
so that partnership benefits will be extended but [Hawaii] will not recognize same-sex marriages.”). 
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relevant question would be when rather than whether Hawaii would recognize 
same-sex marriages.8 
The developments in Hawaii did not escape the attention of members of 
Congress.9 The legal recognition of same-sex marriage would implicate two 
separate concerns: (1) same-sex couples living in other states might go to 
Hawaii, marry, and then return to their domiciles asking that their marriages be 
recognized,10 and (2) federal benefits are accorded to those who are married 
according to state law and thus same-sex couples validly married under Hawaii 
law would be eligible to receive the same benefits that other couples receive.11 
As matters turned out, the Hawaiian litigation did not result in the 
recognition of same-sex marriage.12 By the time that the trial court had issued its 
opinion13 and the Hawaii Supreme Court had considered the state’s appeal of 
the trial court decision,14 the Hawaii Constitution had been changed by 
referendum.15 Even if same-sex marriage had been protected under the 
unamended state constitution, that document was changed to give the state 
legislature the power to reserve marriage for different-sex couples.16 
Congress did not wait to see whether the Hawaii Constitution would be 
amended by referendum or whether the Hawaii Supreme Court would uphold 
the trial court’s striking down the state’s same-sex marriage ban. Instead, the 
Defense of Marriage Act was passed, one provision of which addressed full faith 
and credit matters and the other of which addressed which marriages would 
qualify for federal benefits. 
 
 8. Cf. 142 CONG. REC. H7277 (statement of Rep. Hoke) (July 11, 1996) (“The impending 
recognition of same-sex marriages in Hawaii is what is bringing it to the floor.”). 
 9. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 132 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (“Congress recognized that the 
Hawaii Supreme Court appeared to be on the verge of requiring the State of Hawaii to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.”). 
 10. 142 CONG. REC. H7486 (statement of Rep. Buyer) (July 12, 1996) (“The full faith and credit of 
the Constitution would force States like Indiana to abide by [the recognition of same-sex 
marriage].”). 
 11. Id. at H7484 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“Because this United States Code does not 
contain a definition of marriage, a State’s definition of marriage is regularly utilized in the 
implementation of Federal laws and regulations.”). 
 12. Gregory & Grossman, supra note 6, at 28 (“Same-sex marriage never came to pass in Hawaii 
. . . .”). 
 13. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394-05, 1996 WL 694235, *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996) (“The sex-
based classification in HRS § 572-1, on its face and as applied, is unconstitutional and in violation of 
the equal protection clause of article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution.”). 
 14. See Dean Agnos, Comment, Employee Benefits and the Paradox of Same-Sex Marriages and Equal 
Rights, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 543, 548 (2006) (“[A] stay was granted pending appeal and before 
the appeal was heard, a referendum was passed by Hawaii voters which amended the state 
constitution to permit the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriage . . . .”). 
 15. James Askew, Note, The Slippery Slope: The Vitality of Reynolds v. U.S. After Romer and 
Lawrence,  12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 627, 640 (2006) (“[T]he case was ultimately made moot by a 
referendum in 1998 which amended the Hawaii Constitution to permit the state legislature to restrict 
marriage to men and women only.”). 
 16. Gregory & Grossman, supra note 6, at 28 (“[W]hile the case was pending on remand the 
constitution was amended to grant the legislature the power to ban same-sex marriage . . . .”). 
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B. The Full Faith and Credit Provision 
One section of the Defense of Marriage Act reads as follows: 
No state, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship.17 
Initially, this statute appears relatively easy to understand. As far as full 
faith and credit guarantees are concerned,18 a same-sex marriage validly 
celebrated in one jurisdiction may but need not be recognized in another. For 
example, at the time that this article is being written, five states plus the District 
of Columbia permit same-sex marriages to be celebrated locally— Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Iowa, and Vermont.19 A state like New York, 
whose law does not permit such unions to be celebrated within the state, might 
nonetheless decide that its public policy does not preclude the recognition of 
such unions as long as they are validly celebrated in another state, e.g., 
Connecticut.20 Thus, an individual domiciled in New York might go to 
Connecticut to marry a same-sex partner and then return home and have that 
relationship recognized, even though the relationship would not have been 
legally recognized if, instead, there had been a local ceremony with a 
clergyperson officiating. The difficulty would not have been that a clergyperson 
had officiated (the marriage would have been recognized had the members of 
the couple been of different sexes),21 but that the couple had celebrated it locally 
rather than in a state that would accord the relationship legal recognition.22 
At the very least, the DOMA full faith and credit provision permits, but 
does not require, a domicile to refuse to recognize its own domiciliaries’ same-
sex marriage even if validly celebrated in a sister state. Thus, when the Act says 
that a state is not required to give effect to a public record respecting a same-sex 
relationship that is treated as a marriage under the laws of that other state, the 
 
 17. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 18. A separate question is whether equal protection guarantees are implicated.  See infra notes 
102-06, 115-25 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Clement Tan, Same-Sex Wedding Bells toll in D.C.,  L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at 11 (noting 
that five states plus the District of Columbia permit same-sex marriages to be celebrated) 
 20. See Lewis v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Civil Serv., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578, 583 (App. Div. 2009) (“[T]he 
Supreme Courts of our neighboring states of Connecticut and Massachusetts have defined marriage 
in their states to include the marriage of same-sex couples (see Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (2008); Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003)). Thus, 
regardless of how we define marriage in New York, we must apply the marriage recognition rule to 
determine whether we will recognize same-sex out-of-state marriages for the purpose of according 
their parties spousal benefits.”). 
 21. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 11(1) (McKinney 1999) (Marriage may be solemnized by a 
clergyperson or minister of any religion.). 
 22. Jeff Storey, State Bar ‘Refines’ Position on Same-Sex Couples, Says Marriage Is the Only Possible 
Path to Equality, 6/23/2009 N.Y. L.J. 1 (discussing state bar’s report noting that “courts in New York 
have recognized these out-of- state marriages, resulting in the anomaly that same-sex couples ‘can be 
married in New York; they just can’t get married in New York’”). 
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Act is saying that New York will not be forced to recognize a Connecticut public 
record establishing that a particular New York same-sex couple had married. So, 
too, when the Act says that a state is not required to give effect to a public act 
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a 
marriage, the Act is saying that New York is not required to give effect to a 
same-sex marriage celebrated by New Yorkers in accord with Connecticut law. 
However, it does not seem plausible to give such a limited interpretation when 
the Act says that a state is not required to give effect to a judicial proceeding 
respecting a same-sex relationship that is treated as a marriage under a different 
state’s law. 
As an initial matter, it is not immediately clear how to interpret the 
provision regarding the effects of judicial proceedings at least in part because it 
might simply have been meant to include certain proceedings involving a 
judge—for example, a ceremony in which a justice of the peace marries two 
individuals might qualify as such a proceeding.23 Or, the judicial proceedings 
clause might have been adopted to cover the following scenario: Alex and Brian 
are domiciled in Pennsylvania. They travel to Connecticut, marry, and then 
obtain a declaratory judgment in Connecticut that they are indeed married. 
They then seek to have that declaratory judgment given effect in Pennsylvania, 
notwithstanding that state’s announced refusal to recognize such marriages.24 
By permitting Pennsylvania to refuse to give effect to the Connecticut 
declaratory judgment,25 Pennsylvania would not be forced to recognize its 
domiciliaries’ same-sex marriage, judgment affirming its validity 
notwithstanding.26 
Even assuming that it would be possible to get a Connecticut declaratory 
judgment in these circumstances,27 DOMA’s judicial proceedings language is 
not well-suited to being limited to cases involving a marriage by a justice of the 
peace or to cases in which a declaratory judgment affirming the existence of a 
marriage had been issued. There is no language in the Act limiting the kinds of 
 
 23. Cf. People ex rel. Mitts v. Ham, 206 Ill. App. 543, 546 (1917) (“The relator introduced in 
evidence the statutes of the State of Missouri concerning marriage and also a certified copy of the 
marriage proceedings, including the license, the certificate of the marriage issued by the justice of 
the peace and a certificate of the officials of the State of Missouri showing the official character of the 
justice of the peace.”); 142 CONG. REC. H7480-81 (statement of Rep. Mink) (July 12, 1996) (I would 
like to point out that marriage is not only a religious ceremony. A marriage is also a ceremony 
presided over by a judge or a justice of the peace.”). 
 24. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2001) (“A marriage between persons of the same 
sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, 
shall be void in this Commonwealth.”). 
 25. Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders,  98 NW. U. L. REV. 827, 888 (2004) 
(“[T]here was concern that same-sex partners married in Hawaii would then obtain declaratory 
judgments of their marriages so that other states could not invoke the ‘public policy exception.’ 
DOMA went even further to extend the option to deny full faith and credit to these judgments in 
addition to the marriages themselves.”). 
 26. 150 CONG. REC. H1327 (statement of Rep. Stearns) (Mar. 23, 2004) (“We clarified the full 
faith and credit clause to mean that States do not need to recognize same-sex marriages performed 
and validated in other States.”). 
 27. For the conditions under which a declaratory judgment could be sought, see STATE OF CONN. 
JUDICIAL BRANCH, 2009 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK, § 17-55 (2009). 
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judgments involving same-sex marriages that need not be given effect in other 
states, and the provision might be taken to mean that one state would not have 
to give effect to a divorce of a same-sex couple that had been issued by a court in 
a different state. 
The non-recognition of divorce judgments might offer individuals ways in 
which they could evade their court-imposed responsibilities.28 Suppose, for 
example, that Carl and David divorce in Massachusetts, and the court awards 
Carl both property and spousal support. On one interpretation of the full faith 
and credit provision, David could avoid his court-imposed responsibilities 
simply by moving to a state that refuses to recognize the marriage (or divorce) 
of that couple. 
Consider, for example, the following Georgia constitutional provision: 
This state shall not give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other state or jurisdiction respecting a relationship between persons of the 
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other state or 
jurisdiction. The courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction to grant a divorce 
or separate maintenance with respect to any such relationship or otherwise to 
consider or rule on any of the parties’ respective rights arising as a result of or in 
connection with such relationship.29 
Presumably, this means that if David moved to Atlanta and Carl sought to 
enforce the Massachusetts judgment, the Georgia courts would be precluded 
from considering or enforcing any of the rights arising from the Massachusetts 
decree. Needless to say, such a refusal might result in great unfairness. Carl 
might have made both financial and non-financial contributions to the marriage, 
and the just distribution of the marital assets (as determined by the 
Massachusetts court) would not occur because David had evaded his obligations 
by moving to Georgia. 
Yet, the full faith and credit provision need not be interpreted as 
authorizing a state to refuse to enforce a claim for money damages arising as a 
result of the termination of a same-sex marriage. To see why this is so, it will be 
helpful to consider both what the Act says and what it does not say. The 
provision specifies that states are not required “to give effect to any public act, 
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State [involving a same-sex 
marriage] . . . or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”30 Apparently, the 
drafters were not confident that the provision exempting acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings from full faith and credit guarantees would be understood 
to include associated rights and claims, so they also expressly stated that rights 
or claims arising from such a relationship would also not have to be given full 
faith and credit. Thus, states would not be required to give effect to the 
relationship itself or to any rights or claims arising from it. 
What rights might the drafters have had in mind? While they did not 
elaborate, at least two come to mind. Individuals who are married enjoy a 
 
 28. For a suggestion as to how it might be construed so as not to give rise to this result, see 
notes 30-40 and accompanying text infra. 
 29. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4, para. I, subsec. (b). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (emphasis added). 
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variety of rights including, for example, a presumption of parenthood of a child 
born into the relationship.31 The drafters might have wanted to make clear that a 
child born into a same-sex union would not be presumed to be a child of each of 
the parties.32 Or, the drafters might have believed that a married individual 
would be protected from prosecution for engaging in consensual sexual 
relations with his or her spouse.33 Given that DOMA was passed and signed in 
199634 and state laws criminalizing same-sex relations were not held 
unconstitutional until 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas,35 it might have been thought 
that, absent congressional action, same-sex marriage would provide a way 
whereby individuals with a same-sex orientation would be immunized from 
prosecution for engaging in sexual relations with their partners. 
The point here is not to list all of the rights that are associated with 
marriage,36 but merely to point out the provision’s lack of parallelism with 
respect to the ways that relationships and judicial proceedings are treated. With 
respect to the latter, the Act did not say that neither the judicial proceeding itself 
nor any rights arising from such a proceeding would be entitled to full faith and 
credit, but simply said that a judicial proceeding itself would not need to be 
credited.37 
Why should a state be required to enforce rights or claims arising from a 
proceeding without recognizing the proceeding itself? Arguably, recognizing 
the divorce proceeding would recognize the marital union itself, whereas simply 
enforcing a claim for money damages need not involve a recognition much less 
an endorsement of a same-sex relationship. Money damages are awarded for a 
variety of reasons, and states might not be thought to be making any kind of 
broad policy statement simply by requiring an individual to pay an existing 
debt. The drafters might have been thinking that states would now be 
authorized to refuse to give effect to the proceeding (because giving effect to 
 
 31. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204 (a) (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2004); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105 (1) (2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5 (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 31-14-7-1 (LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE § 598.31 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114 (a) (2000); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.011 (West 2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (Supp. 2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 209C, § 6 (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55 (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822 
(2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 
109.070 (1) (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304(a) (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204 (a) (Vernon 
2008); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (1) (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.41 (1)(a) (West Supp. 
2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504 (a) (2009). 
 32. For a discussion of how presumptions of parenthood might be treated in other states where 
the parents are of the same sex, see generally Mark Strasser, When Is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, 
Civil Unions, and Presumptions of Parenthood, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 299-324 (2001). 
 33. Cf. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 344 (D.C. 1995) (noting that husband and 
wife have a protected right to engage in consensual sodomy). 
 34. Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the 
Constitution, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 279 (1997) (“The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) [was] signed 
into law on September 21, 1996 . . . .”). 
 35. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 36. Cf. Caleb W. Langston, Comment, Fundamental Right, Fundamentally Wronged: Oregon’s 
Unconstitutional Stand on Same-Sex Marriage, 84 OR. L.  REV. 861, 867 n.22 (2005) (“In a report issued in 
January 2004, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) identified 1138 federal statutory 
provisions that confer benefits, rights, and privileges conditioned upon marital status.”). 
 37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (“to give effect to any . . . judicial proceeding”) 
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such a proceeding would involve recognizing a relationship that allegedly 
violated an important public policy of the state), but that states would not be 
authorized to refuse to enforce debts (which, after all, might have arisen in any 
number of circumstances).38 
It might be argued that the language referring to rights was included to 
make crystal clear that no rights arising from a same-sex relationship would 
have to be recognized.39 Yet, such an explanation raises still other issues. Even 
had that sentence not been included, it would have been assumed that rights 
arising by virtue of a marriage in one state would be subject to a public policy 
exception in a different state, precisely because those rights would be viewed as 
arising by virtue of that state’s laws.40 However, the same assumption would not 
have been made about rights arising from a judgment, since the existing law had 
been that rights reduced to judgment were enforceable throughout the country, 
public policy of a particular state to the contrary notwithstanding.41 Thus, one 
would have expected the Act to make crystal clear that rights arising from 
judgments did not have to be accorded full faith and credit rather than that 
rights arising from a sister state’s laws did not have to be given effect. By 
specifying that the rights arising by virtue of the relationship would not have to 
be credited but not saying the same about rights reduced to judgment, the Act 
implicitly reinforces existing law rather than supplants it. 
One issue yet to be resolved by the courts involves what this provision was 
intended to do. Offering a definitive construction of legislative intent on this 
matter is quite difficult if only because members of Congress did not seem to 
appreciate the implications of modifying the credit due to judgments. First, 
some seemed to believe that the DOMA full faith and credit provision was 
simply reflecting current law,42 even though then-existing law required states to 
recognize divorce judgments validly issued in other states.43 Other members 
 
 38. Cf. Borchers, supra note 3, at 182 (1998) (“I, for one, would not construe DOMA to affect the 
obligation of courts to recognize money judgments simply because the existence of a same-sex 
marriage played into the underlying theory that led to the judgment.”). 
 39. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7277 (statement of Rep. Hoke) (July 11, 1996) (“[W]hat we are 
going to do is we are going to make it crystal clear that a State will not have to recognize a same-
gender marriage if it chooses not to.”). 
 40. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1998) (“The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not compel ‘a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing 
with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.’” (citing Pac. Employers Ins. Co. 
v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)). 
 41. Id. at 233 (“Regarding judgments, however, the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A 
final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject 
matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.”). 
 42. See 142 CONG. REC. S10, 100, S10, 103 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (Sept. 10, 1996) (“There is 
nothing earth-shattering here. No breaking of new ground. No setting of new precedents. Indeed, 
there [sic] provisions simply reaffirm what is already known, what is already in place.”); Id. at H7482 
(statement of Rep. Frank) (July 12, 1996) (“Every single sponsor of this bill believes as I do that the 
States already have the right that this bill gives them.”). 
 43. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (“So, when a court of one state acting in 
accord with the requirements of procedural due process alters the marital status of one domiciled in 
that state by granting him a divorce from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree should be 
excepted from the full faith and credit clause merely because its enforcement or recognition in 
another state would conflict with the policy of the latter.”). 
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seemed to understand that this provision might be changing the current 
system,44 although they did not explore the kinds of changes that they were 
creating. The focus for most members of Congress seemed to be on whether 
same-sex marriages validly celebrated in Hawaii would have to be recognized in 
the other states rather than on whether divorce judgments would have to be 
recognized.45 
One ironic implication of this provision is that same-sex divorces might be 
subject to non-recognition even in states not having any objections to same-sex 
marriage. Consider a state that recognizes same-sex marriage but strongly 
disapproves of divorce and limits the conditions under which individuals can 
terminate their marriages. That state’s law specifying the conditions under 
which marriages could be ended would of course apply to all local married 
couples, whether composed of individuals of the same sex or of different sexes. 
The complication posed by DOMA is that the Act seems to authorize a state to 
refuse to recognize a same-sex divorce granted in another jurisdiction if that 
latter jurisdiction made it too simple to secure a divorce. 
Suppose, for example, that Massachusetts changes its divorce law to reflect 
Maryland’s, which permits couples to divorce when they have been living 
separate and apart for at least a year.46 Vermont’s law is less stringent, since it 
permits couples to divorce if they have been living separate and apart for six 
months.47 
 
 44. See 142 CONG. REC. H7492 (statement of Rep. Skaggs) (July 12, 1996) (“Perhaps, the States 
don’t have quite all the powers this bill would give them, because it also apparently would grant 
States the power to ignore certain final judicial proceedings concluded in another State. The public-
policy exception has not previously been construed to go that far.”); id. at H7274 (statement of Rep. 
Campbell) (July 11, 1996) (“Congress may under the clause describe a certain type of divorce and say 
it shall be granted recognition throughout the Union and that no other kind shall.”). 
 45. See, e.g, id. at H7277 (statement of Rep. Hoke) (July 11, 1996) (“For example, if two 
individuals of the same gender obtain a marriage license in Hawaii and then move to Ohio, the State 
of Ohio would have to honor that marriage license. The people of Ohio would have no say in the 
matter.”); id. at S12, 015 (Sen. Abraham) (Sept. 30, 1996) (“DOMA deals only with the following 
issue: If State A decides to allow people of the same sex to marry, does Federal law require State B to 
treat these individuals as married as well if they decide to move to State B? DOMA answers that 
question in the negative: No, Federal law does not require State B to treat them as married just 
because State A chooses to do so.”). 
 46. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-103 (2006): 
(a) The court may decree an absolute divorce on the following grounds: 
 . . . 
(3) voluntary separation, if: 
(i) the parties voluntarily have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for 
12 months without interruption before the filing of the application for divorce; 
and 
(ii) there is no reasonable expectation of reconciliation; 
 . . . 
(5) 2-year separation, when the parties have lived separate and apart without 
cohabitation for 2 years without interruption before the filing of the application for 
divorce . . . . 
 47. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 551 (2002) (“A divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed . 
. . (7) When a married person has lived apart from his or her spouse for six consecutive months and 
the court finds that the resumption of marital relations is not reasonably probable.”). 
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Consider the hypothetical couple, Ellen and Frieda, who have married in 
Vermont but have decided to divorce. They live separate and apart for the 
required six months, and then dissolve their union in accord with local law. 
Ellen decides to move to Massachusetts to start a new life. On its face, DOMA 
would permit Massachusetts to refuse to recognize the Vermont divorce. The 
state’s rationale would not be that it disapproves of same-sex marriages but that 
it disapproves of permitting individuals to divorce when they have only been 
living apart for six months. 
The state would not be trying to punish same-sex couples. On the contrary, 
were the state permitted to do so, it would refuse to recognize any divorce 
granted when the couple had only been living apart for six months. However, 
the state is precluded by the Full Faith and Credit Clause from refusing to credit 
divorce judgments validly issued in other states, unless the members of the 
couple happen to be of the same sex. 
The DOMA full faith and credit provision is not a federalism provision that 
simply accords states the power to decide which judgments are contrary to the 
strong public policy of the state.48 Rather, it picks out a subset of judgments—
those involving same-sex couples—and makes only those subject to non-
recognition in sister states. Rather than promote states’ rights, the provision is 
simply a vehicle by which members of the LGBT community can be subjected to 
unique burdens. 
C. Is the Full Faith and Credit Provision Constitutional? 
A separate issue is whether Congress has the power to pass this DOMA 
provision. While there is language in the Constitution authorizing Congress to 
pass laws affecting full faith and credit, that language has yet to be 
authoritatively construed. Article IV, section 1, of the United States Constitution 
reads: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general 
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall 
be proved, and the Effect thereof.49 
There has been some debate whether the second sentence gives Congress 
the power to increase or decrease the credit to be given to sister state acts, 
records, and proceedings or whether, instead, it only gives Congress the power 
to increase the credit to be given. For example, Professor Tribe suggests that 
Congress does not have the power to decrease the credit due to judgments of 
sister states,50 although the Court has not yet fully discussed much less adopted 
that position. 
 
 48. See 142 CONG. REC. S10, 110 (Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (DOMA “would protect 
federalism interests and State sovereignty . . . .”); Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, 
Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 220 (1998) 
(“DOMA protects the crucial balance of federalism in our constitutional system . . . .”). 
 49. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
 50. See 142 CONG. REC. S5931-33 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (introducing a letter from 
Laurence Tribe, which read in relevant part: 
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The reason that the Court has not yet had to directly address the contours 
of Congress’s power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is that Congress 
passed legislation in 179051 establishing that the judgments issued in one state 
would have “such faith and credit given to them in every court within the 
United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from 
whence the said records are or shall be taken.”52 Often, when discussing the 
demands imposed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court considers the 
constitutional and statutory text in tandem, and does not distinguish between 
the demands imposed by the Constitution and the demands imposed by the 
congressional statute. Thus, in Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Hunt,53 the Court 
discussed “the command of the Constitution and the statute.”54 The Court 
explained that it was not “aware of any considerations of local policy or law 
which could rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect which the full faith 
and credit clause and the Act of Congress require to be given to . . . a judgment 
outside the state of its rendition.”55 Even when discussing the “unifying force” 
of the Clause, which “altered the status of the several states as independent 
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under 
the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each 
an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any 
part are given nation-wide application,”56 the Court did not make clear whether 
the Clause itself had this effect or, instead, whether the Clause and the Act of 
Congress together had this effect. 
The Court has explained: 
The faith and credit required to be given to judgments does not depend on the 
Constitution alone. Article 4, § 1, not only commands that “full Faith and Credit 
shall be given” . . . but it adds “Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the 
Effect thereof.” And Congress has exercised this power . . . and specifically 
directs that judgments “shall have such faith and credit given to them in every 
court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the 
State from which they are taken.”57 
The Court had never made clear whether Congress would have been 
within its constitutional power if affording less faith and credit to judgments 
than it did in the 1790 Act, although the Court has hinted that Congress could 
not have lessened the obligation to enforce a judgment from a sister state. For 
 
The basic point is a simple one: The Full Faith and Credit Clause authorizes Congress to 
enforce the clause’s self-executing requirements insofar as judicial enforcement alone, as 
overseen by the Supreme Court, might reasonably be deemed insufficient. But the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause confers upon Congress no power to gut its self-executing 
requirements, either piecemeal or all at once. 
 51. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (discussing “the act of May 26, 1790, chap. 
11, 1 Stat. at L. 122 (REV. STAT. § 905, U. S. COMP. STAT. 1901, p. 677)”). 
 52. Id. (quoting  REV. STAT. § 905, U. S. COMP. STAT. 1901, p. 677). 
 53. 320 U.S. 430 (1943). 
 54. Id. at 438. 
 55. Id. (citing Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277-78 (1935)). 
 56. Id. at 439 (citing M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. at 276-77). 
 57. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. at 273. 
Strasser_paginated.doc 7/2/2010  2:59:08 PM 
410 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:399 2010 
example, the Court noted in Davis v. Davis58 that “Congress [had] rightly 
interpreted the clause to mean not some, but full credit.”59 Perhaps that means 
that Congress would have been exceeding its power if lessening the credit due 
to judgments. 
After noting in Williams v. North Carolina60 that there was no public 
exception that would permit a state not to give full faith and credit to a divorce 
judgment from another state,61 the Supreme Court expressly refused to address 
whether Congress had the power to create such an exception.62 Nonetheless, the 
Court made clear that the creation of such an exception would undermine the 
purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause “to a substantial degree,”63 
especially considering “the considerable interests involved and the substantial 
and far-reaching effects which the allowance of an exception would have on 
innocent persons.”64 Further, the Court has noted that “while Congress clearly 
has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State must 
accord to the laws or judgments of another State, there is at least some question 
whether Congress may cut back on the measure of faith and credit required by a 
decision of this Court.”65 On the other hand, Justices have sometimes suggested 
in dicta that Congress has broad powers under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.66 
Whether Congress had the power to enact the DOMA full faith and credit 
provision has not been extensively analyzed in the courts. For example, in 
Wilson v. Ake,67 a Florida district court rejected the claim that “Congress may 
only regulate what effect a law may have, it may not dictate that the law has no 
effect at all”68 by suggesting that “Congress’ actions in adopting DOMA are 
exactly what the Framers envisioned when they created the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.”69 Regrettably, the Wilson court did not even consider the 
 
 58. 305 U.S. 32 (1938). 
 59. Id. at 39-40 (citing Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 567 (1906)) (emphasis added). 
 60. 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
 61. Id. at 303. 
 62. Id. (“Whether Congress has the power to create exceptions (see Yarborough v. Yarborough, 
290 U.S. 202, 215, 54 S.Ct. 181, 186, 78 L.Ed. 269, 90 A.L.R. 924, note 2, dissenting opinion) is a 
question on which we express no view. It is sufficient here to note that Congress in its sweeping 
requirement that judgments of the courts of one state be given full faith and credit in the courts of 
another has not done so.”) 
 63. Id. at 304. 
 64. Id. at 303-04. 
 65. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980) (citing Paul A. Freund, 
Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1229-30 (1946)). 
 66. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 366 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The answer to so 
tangled a problem as that of our conflicting divorce laws is not to be achieved by the simple judicial 
resources of either/or—this decree is good and must be respected, that one is bad and may be 
disregarded. We cannot draw on the available power for social invention afforded by the 
Constitution for dealing adequately with the problem, because the power belongs to the Congress 
and not to the Court.”); Yarborough v. Yarborough,  290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2 (1933) (Stone, J., 
dissenting) (“The mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as defined by this Court may be, 
in some degree not yet fully defined, expanded or contracted by Congress.”) (emphasis added). 
 67. 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 68. Id. at 1303. 
 69. Id. 
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prevailing jurisprudence in this area, apparently unaware of the differing views 
expressed by members of the Court regarding whether Congress had the power 
to reduce the credit to be given to other states’ judgments.70 
At least one reason that this issue has not been analyzed thoroughly is that 
there have been relatively few cases challenging DOMA. Because no state 
recognized same-sex marriage until 2003,71 individuals did not even have 
standing to make a challenge until fairly recently.72 Further, just because some 
states recognize same-sex marriage does not give individuals standing to 
challenge DOMA unless they themselves have married in accord with local 
law.73 For example, Smelt v. Orange County74 involved a constitutional challenge 
to DOMA by Arthur Smelt and Christopher Hammer.75 While the two had a 
legal relationship with each other in that they were domestic partners under 
California law,76 they were not married under California or any other state’s 
law.77 For that reason, the Ninth Circuit found that they lacked standing.78 
Were the Court to hear a challenge to the DOMA full faith and credit 
provision, it might take the opportunity to limit the power of Congress to 
decrease the credit due judgments. Indeed, in a different respect, the Court has 
taken the opportunity in the recent past to bolster the robustness of full faith and 
credit guarantees.79 
At one point, members of the Court hinted that there might be a public 
policy exception to full faith and credit guarantees regarding the enforcement of 
judgments. For example, after noting that as a general matter final judgments 
are entitled to full faith and credit,80 the Williams Court suggested that there are 
exceptions to this rule,81 although the “actual exceptions have been few and far 
between.”82 Thus, one would have inferred from Williams that there existed 
some, albeit very few, exceptions to the rule that final judgments must be 
respected by sister states.83 However, in Baker v. General Motors,84 the Court 
 
 70. See id. In a rather conclusory fashion, the court announced, “Congress' actions in adopting 
DOMA are exactly what the Framers envisioned when they created the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.” 
 71. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (striking down 
Massachusetts same-sex marriage ban). 
 72. 150 CONG. REC. H1328 (Mar. 23, 2004) (statement of Rep. Stearns) (“But in order to challenge 
DOMA, plaintiffs need standing to sue. That was accomplished a month ago when the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision set the stage for a constitutional challenge.”). 
 73. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. at 677. 
 76. Id. at 684. 
 77. Id. at 683 (“Smelt and Hammer are not even married under any state law, or, for that matter, 
under the law of any foreign country.”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Williams, 317 U.S. at 294. 
 81. Id. at 294 (“Some exceptions have been engrafted on the rule.”). 
 82. Id. at 295. 
 83. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 426 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is true 
that the commands of the Full Faith and Credit Clause are not inexorable in the sense that 
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made clear that there was no public policy exception permitting a state to refuse 
to credit a final judgment from another state.85 So, too, in a case involving 
DOMA, the Court might take the opportunity to clear up some of the lingering 
doubts regarding Congress’ power to decrease the credit due judgments. 
Perhaps the Court will continue its established practice of refusing to face 
that question head-on,86 instead deciding the constitutionality of the provision 
on other grounds. For example, the Court might suggest that whether or not 
Congress had the power to make general laws prescribing the effect that 
judgments will have in sister states, it cannot pick out a particular sub-group 
and make their divorce judgments, but no one else’s, subject to non-
recognition.87 
D. Defining Marriage for Federal Purposes 
The DOMA provision defining marriage for federal purposes reads: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, 
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the 
United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man 
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.88 
This provision does not seem as open to multiple interpretations as is the 
full faith and credit provision.89 Further, the provision might seem less 
constitutionally vulnerable, because it is only attempting to provide clarification 
of what marriage means for federal purposes. Nonetheless, this section has a 
few constitutional difficulties. 
As an initial matter, the breadth of this provision must be appreciated, 
since it applies whenever marital status for federal purposes is at issue. Thus, 
while this provision affects who will receive benefits and implicates federal 
spending,90 the provision is by no means limited to spending.91 For example, 
 
exceptional circumstances may relieve a State from giving full faith and credit to the judgment of a 
sister State because ‘obnoxious’ to an overriding policy of its own.”). 
 84. 522 U.S. 222 (1998). 
 85. Id. at 233 (“Regarding judgments, however, the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A 
final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject 
matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.”). 
 86. See supra notes 58-64 (discussing the Court’s contradictory signals on this matter). 
 87. See Strasser, supra note 34, at 299 (suggesting that at issue is whether Congress “has the 
power to make a full faith and credit exception for a particular subtype of judgment”). 
 88. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 89. See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 
1673 (2007) (“[N]ow that DOMA has been enacted, the federal stance on same-sex marriage is 
perfectly clear.”). 
 90. See 142 CONG. REC. H7276 -77 (July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“What this bill says 
in the second clause is that if Colorado or New York or Hawaii or New Jersey or any State chooses 
whether by judicial fiat or by action of its legislature or by public referendum of its people to 
recognize same sex marriages, the Federal Government will not recognize those marriages for 
purposes of Social Security or Veterans’ Administration benefits or pensions or tax benefits or 
anything else.”). 
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suppose that an American national marries a Canadian national, whether in 
Toronto or in Boston. If the couple is composed of individuals of the same sex, 
the United States government will not recognize the marriage,92 whereas the 
marriage would have been recognized had the couple been composed of 
individuals of different sexes.93 This differential treatment might have very 
important implications should the couple wish to reside in the United States.94 
Second, it must be understood just how unusual it is for Congress to 
attempt to define family,95 given that family law is a “peculiarly state 
province.”96 That said, Congress can and does pass legislation implicating 
domestic relations,97 although Congress must bear a special burden when doing 
so. In Rose v. Rose,98 the Court explained, “[b]efore a state law governing 
domestic relations will be overridden, it ‘must do “major damage” to “clear and 
substantial” federal interests.’”99 
What are the clear and substantial federal interests at stake? While money 
might be saved by refusing to accord federal benefits to same-sex couples, it is 
not at all clear how much that would be.100 Further, the Court has already 
suggested that saving money may well not suffice as a justification for 
supplanting state law with federal law in the domestic relations context. For 
example, after noting in United States v. Yazell101 that “there is always a federal 
interest to collect moneys which the Government lends,”102 the Court 
nonetheless rejected that a substantial interest was implicated that would justify 
supplanting state law with federal law. The Yazell Court explained that both 
 
 91. See CONG. REC. H7273 (July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (“What we are saying 
today is even if States vote unanimously to allow this type of marriage, the Federal Government will 
not recognize it.”). See also Stephen D. Sugarman, What Is a “Family“? Conflicting Messages from Our 
Public Programs, 42 FAM. L.Q. 231, 253 n. 85 (2008) (“DOMA’s definition of “marriage” as a legal 
union between one man and one woman applies to all acts of Congress, including federal immigration 
law.”). 
 92. Cori K. Garland, Note, Say “I Do”: The Judicial Duty to Heighten Constitutional Scrutiny of 
Immigration Policies Affecting Same-Sex Binational Couples, 84 IND. L.J. 689, 702 (2009) (“Because 
DOMA refuses to recognize same-sex marriage or any union of a same-sex couple, spousal 
immigration benefits cannot be conferred on same-sex binational couples.”). 
 93. Id. at 691 (“One legal entitlement of marriage is the relative ease with which a heterosexual 
binational couple may acquire a visa for the non-citizen spouse.”). 
 94. Id. (“Same-sex binational couples face tremendous obstacles to maintaining their loving, 
committed relationships in the United States.”). 
 95. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (“[T]here is no federal law of domestic 
relations . . . .”). 
 96. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 353 (1966). 
 97. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989) (“Congress has directly and specifically 
legislated in the area of domestic relations.”). 
 98. 481 U.S. 619 (1987). 
 99. Id. at 625 (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). 
 100. Cf. Maria A. La Vita, Note, When the Honeymoon Is Over: How a Federal Court’s Denial of the 
Spousal Privilege to a Legally Married Same-Sex Couple Can Result in the Incarceration of a Spouse Who 
Refuses to Adversely Testify, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243, 279 (2007) (“In the 
Congressional hearings prior to the enactment of DOMA, Senator Byrd admitted that he did not 
have any reliable estimates of how much money it would cost the federal government if federal 
benefits were extended to same-sex marriages.”). 
 101. 382 U.S. 341 (1966). 
 102. Id. at 348. 
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“theory and the precedents of this Court teach us solicitude for state interests, 
particularly in the field of family and family-property arrangements.”103 
Members of Congress were concerned that additional federal monies might 
have to be spent were same-sex marriages recognized for federal purposes; 
however, they did not focus on how much that would involve but, instead, on 
who would receive the monies. Representative Barr explained that “if you do 
not believe it is fiscally responsible to throw open the doors of the U.S. Treasury 
to be raided by the homosexual movement, then the choice is very clear.”104 
Needless to say, a spouse hoping to receive Social Security benefits so that he or 
she would have enough to live on would be unlikely to be funding the 
“homosexual movement.” Indeed, it is hard to read a comment like this without 
suspecting that animus played some role in the Act’s adoption.105 
The Court has already struck down legislation that was designed to 
prevent a disfavored group from receiving federal benefits on rational basis 
grounds.106 The Moreno Court explained, “[f]or if the constitutional conception 
of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean 
that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”107 There, Congress was trying to 
make sure that hippies did not benefit from a federal program.108 
Arguably, this DOMA provision is unconstitutional on rational basis 
grounds—it should not be difficult to show that it was adopted out of animus,109 
since members of Congress were not shy about vilifying members of the LGBT 
community.110 But the point here is that the traditional test to determine whether 
 
 103. Id. at 352. 
 104. 142 CONG. REC. H7488 (July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (emphasis added). 
 105. Cf In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Whether DOMA’s sweeping 
classification has a proper legislative end, or whether it reflects no more than an invidious design to 
stigmatize and disadvantage same-sex couples, is a hard question.”). 
 106. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f it is to be sustained, the 
challenged classification must rationally further some legitimate governmental interest . . . . The 
challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained . . . ”). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (“ The legislative history that does exist, however, indicates that that amendment was 
intended to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the food stamp 
program.”). 
 109. See In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he denial of federal benefits to 
same-sex spouses cannot be justified as an expression of the government’s disapproval of 
homosexuality, preference for heterosexuality, or desire to discourage gay marriage.”). 
 110. 142 CONG. REC. H7276 (July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Johnston) (“Demonizing 
Communist countries, welfare mothers, or immigrants is now old news. So the demon du jour is 
gays.”); Id. at H7491 (July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady) (“It is an attempt to evade the basic 
question of whether the law of this country should treat homosexual relationships as morally 
equivalent to heterosexual relationships. That is what is at stake here.”);See also id. (statement of Rep. 
Studds) (“Words have been thrown around. . . . promiscuity, perversion, hedonism, narcissism, . . . 
depravity and sin.”); id. at H7275 (July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (“We have a basic 
institution, an institution basic not only to this country’s foundation and to its survival but to every 
Western civilization, under direct assault by homosexual extremists all across this country, not just 
in Hawaii.”); id. (statement of Rep. Barr) (“It is an issue that is being forced on us directly by assault 
by the homosexual extremists to attack the institution of marriage.”); id. at  H7497 (July 12, 1996) 
(statement of Rep. Collins) (“Mr. Chairman, the so-called Defense of Marriage Act should really be 
called the Republican Offense on People Who are Different Act because it is nothing more than 
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Congress may supplant state domestic relations law is not merely the rational 
basis test—on the contrary, the federal government has a heavier burden to 
shoulder.111 
Some members of Congress seemed to believe that DOMA was necessary 
to protect the very institution of marriage.112 First, it should not be necessary to 
point out that the institution of marriage is alive and well in Massachusetts, 
notwithstanding that state’s recognition of same-sex marriage.113 Second, it 
might be noted that the DOMA provision at issue does not prevent states from 
recognizing same-sex marriages. Nor does it prevent states from according 
benefits to such marriages, so that same-sex couples would have both symbolic 
and practical reasons to enter into such unions. Instead, DOMA merely 
withholds the federal benefits. Thus, the statute was not designed to secure the 
articulated goal of “protecting” marriage, even if it were plausible to believe that 
recognition of same-sex marriage would somehow hurt the institution.114 
 
blatant homophobic gay-bashing.”); id. at  S10, 101 (Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“The 
Defense of Marriage Act is . . . a response to an attack upon the institution of marriage itself.”); id. at  
S10, 110 (Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“The drive for same-sex marriage is, in effect, an 
effort to make a sneak attack on society by encoding this aberrant behavior in legal form before 
society itself has decided it should be legal — a proposition which is far in the distance, if ever to be 
realized.”); id. at  H7494 (July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“Same-sex ‘marriages’ demean the 
fundamental institution of marriage. They legitimize unnatural and immoral behavior. And they 
trivialize marriage as a mere ‘lifestyle choice.’  The institution of marriage sets a necessary and high 
standard. Anything that lowers this standard, as same-sex ‘marriages’ do, inevitably belittles 
marriage.  Traditional marriage has served across the majority of cultures as a foundation for a 
stable society. Undermining traditional marriage by forcing States to legalize same-sex ‘marriages’ 
will have far-reaching social consequences. The attempt to legitimize same-sex ‘marriages’ threatens 
our cultural values that have proved their worth down the centuries.  Those who seek to overturn 
our system of values are attempting to achieve not just toleration of their behavior, but full social 
acceptance as well.”). 
 111. See Rose v. Rose  481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (suggesting that federal law can supplant state 
domestic relations law only when the state law would do major damage to substantial federal 
interests). 
 112. Id. at H7276 (July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Largent)  (“Destroying the exclusive territory 
of marriage to achieve a political end will not provide homosexuals with the real benefits of 
marriage, but it may eventually be the final blow to the American family.”); id. at S10, 111 (Sept. 10, 
1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“If same-sex marriage is accepted, the announcement will be official, 
America will have said that children do not need a mother and a father, two mothers or two fathers 
will be just as good. This would be a catastrophe.”). 
 113. Vanessa A. Lavely, Comment, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Reconciling the 
Inconsistencies Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 247, 277 (2007) (“Even 
Massachusetts legislators who initially opposed same-sex marriage have since conceded that the 
Goodridge decision did not adversely affect the institution of marriage.”). 
 114. Strasser, supra note 34, at 318. 
DOMA does not prevent states from recognizing same-sex marriages. It merely denies 
federal benefits to same-sex couples. If the purpose of DOMA is to protect the institution 
of marriage, and if including same-sex couples really changes the institution, then DOMA 
is not rationally designed to meet its goal since it does not protect the institution. DOMA 
neither prevents the definition nor the institution from being changed; it merely allows 
Congress not to accord the federal benefits that go along with marriage. 
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E. The Challenges to the Federal Definition of Marriage Provision 
The federal judiciary has offered mixed responses to the constitutionality of 
this provision. For example, in In re Kandu,115 a federal bankruptcy judge upheld 
the provision on rational basis grounds. After noting that the “review afforded 
under this rational basis standard is very deferential to the legislature,”116 the 
court held that “DOMA does not violate either the Due Process or Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”117 
Two circuit court judges have suggested in separate orders that this DOMA 
provision runs afoul of constitutional guarantees. In In re Golinski,118 Chief Judge 
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a staff attorney at the Ninth 
Circuit headquarters could have her same-sex spouse covered under the Federal 
Employees Health Benefit Act (FEHBA).119 Judge Kozinski construed the Act as 
permitting the coverage,120 notwithstanding DOMA,121 at least in part because 
his construction “avoid[ed] difficult constitutional issues.”122 He noted that were 
FEHBA to be construed as precluding coverage for same-sex spouses, there 
would be some question whether “such an exclusion furthers a legitimate 
governmental end.”123 He reasoned that because “mere moral disapproval of 
homosexual conduct isn’t such an end, the answer to this question is at least 
doubtful.”124 
In In re Levenson,125 Judge Reinhardt, also of the Ninth Circuit, addressed 
the same issue, namely, whether an individual’s same-sex spouse could be 
included under the federal employee’s insurance policy.126 While agreeing with 
Judge Kozinski that the spouse could not be excluded from coverage,127 Judge 
Reinhardt rejected that FEHBA was ambiguous and instead addressed the 
constitutionality of DOMA.128 Although believing that heightened scrutiny 
would have been the appropriate standard of review,129 he noted that “the 
denial of benefits here cannot survive even rational basis review, the least 
searching form of constitutional scrutiny.”130 
 
 115. Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004). 
 116. Id. at 145. 
 117. Id. at 148. 
 118. 587 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 119. See id. at 902. 
 120. See id. at 904 (“I therefore construe the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act to permit the 
coverage of same-sex spouses.”). 
 121. See id. at 902 (“[T]he Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
refused to certify Golinski’s identification of her spouse as family, because he believed that such an 
identification was barred by the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).”). 
 122. Id. at 903. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 560 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 126. See id. at 1145. 
 127. See id. at 1149 (“I adopt the same remedy as the Chief Judge . . . .”). 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. (“I believe it likely that some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny applies to 
Levenson’s claims.”) 
 130. Id. 
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A few points might be made about these differing views of the provision’s 
constitutionality. The disagreement has focused on whether this provision can 
withstand constitutional scrutiny under rational basis review. The bankruptcy 
judge held that it could, Judge Kozinski implied but did not state that it could 
not, and Judge Reinhardt expressly rejected that it could withstand such 
scrutiny. 
Before one simply dismisses this as a difference of opinion and concludes, 
for example, that it should have relatively little persuasive power in the context 
of a challenge arising in a different circuit,131 an important element of the 
bankruptcy opinion should be emphasized. When analyzing the claim that 
“Congress may preempt state family law, in favor of a federal standard, only 
when specific conditions are met,”132 the Kandu court reasoned that in the case at 
hand there was “no conflict between state and federal policy.”133 The federal 
government’s supplanting state law was not at issue, because “Washington State 
has adopted its own definition of marriage identical to DOMA, defining 
marriage for state purposes as the legal union of one man and one woman.”134 
Because no conflict was shown, the federal government did not need to establish 
which substantial interests would be served by supplanting state law.135 
Suppose, however, that this had been a bankruptcy proceeding in 
Massachusetts, where the outcome depended upon whether the state rather 
than the federal definition of marriage was used.136 In that event, there would 
have been a “direct conflict between the state and federal policy,”137 and a 
different standard of review would have been triggered. While there might be 
some debate about whether this DOMA provision can survive constitutional 
scrutiny under the most deferential review, there likely would have been no 
debate whatsoever had a more stringent standard of review been employed. 
III. AFTER DOMA 
Suppose that a court were to strike down or that Congress were simply to 
repeal one or both DOMA provisions. While many of the fears articulated by 
members of Congress would be proven to have been baseless, it is nonetheless 
true that there would be various salutary effects for members of the LGBT 
community. Some of those are described below. 
 
 131. Here, all of these analyses were written by jurists in the Ninth Circuit.  The bankruptcy 
judge is in the state of Washington. While the two orders were by well-respected judges on the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, they were orders rather than opinions—it is simply unclear what a 
Ninth Circuit panel would say about this provision’s constitutionality. 
 132. Kandu, 315 B.R. at 132. 
 133. Id. at 133. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. In this case, unlike the cases cited above, there is no conflict between state and federal 
policy. Washington State has adopted its own definition of marriage identical to DOMA, defining 
marriage for state purposes as the legal union of one man and one woman. Preemption is not at 
issue since federal and Washington state standards remain identical. 
 136. The federal definition provision has been challenged on different grounds in the First 
Circuit. See Same-Sex Unions Changing, State by State, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Apr. 19, 2009, at 16 
(discussing the challenge to the federal benefits provision of DOMA). 
 137. Kandu, 315 B.R. at 133. 
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A. Repeal of the Federal Definition of Marriage Provision 
Were the definition of marriage for federal purposes provision repealed, 
members of the LGBT community would be benefited in a number of ways. A 
host of federal benefits are associated with marriage,138 including immigration 
rights and Social Security benefits.139 
Some additional points should be made about the effects that this would 
have, however. For example, merely because the federal government was 
willing to recognize a same-sex marriage that was valid in the domicile would 
not mean that Georgia would have to recognize same-sex marriages. Absent a 
finding that same-sex marriage bans themselves violate federal constitutional 
guarantees, the states would be free to prevent their domiciliaries from 
marrying same-sex partners. Further, the federal government’s recognizing 
same-sex marriages would not mean that the government would have to treat 
civil unions, for example, as the equivalent of marriages for federal purposes. 
Indeed, absent specific legislation to that effect by Congress, it seems likely that 
couples in a civil union or domestic partnership would not be viewed as 
“married.”140 
Even were this DOMA provision repealed or struck down, it would not be 
surprising if some members of Congress objected to treating civil unions as the 
equivalent of marriages, perhaps out of a desire to continue to differentiate 
marriage from other kinds of relationships. Those who wish to privilege 
marriage might want to make marriage special, whether those entering into the 
relationship are of the same sex or of different sexes. For example, some might 
believe that marriage is the bedrock of society, providing the setting in which 
children can flourish.141 Yet, such a rationale would not justify excluding those 
in civil unions from federal benefits, since those who have contracted civil 
unions have taken on all of the obligations of marriage and, further, may well 
have children to raise. Further, even were it justifiable to accord more federal 
benefits to marriages than to other relationships involving fewer responsibilities, 
that would not suffice to establish that there should be no federal recognition of 
any relationships that did not involve all of the responsibilities of marriage. 
Others do not seem to be interested in privileging marriage per se but, 
instead, are interested in privileging “traditional marriage,” i.e., a marriage 
 
 138. See Justin T. Wilson, Note, Preservationism, or the Elephant in the Room: How Opponents of 
Same-Sex Marriage Deceive Us into Establishing Religion, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 561, 569 
n.36 (2007) (“A recent report released by the presently-named Government Accountability Office 
identified 1,138 discrete federal-level benefits that attach to legal marriage.”). 
 139. Jonathan Rauch, Not Whether but How: Gay Marriage and the Revival of Burkean Conservatism, 
50 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008). 
 140. Cf. Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822, 831 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (“Both the courts and the other 
state legislatures, in providing for civil unions, took pains to distinguish a civil union or life 
partnership from marriage. Governor Paterson’s Directive, by contrast, applies only to same sex 
marriages and not to civil unions or life partnerships.”). 
 141. See Zablocki v. Redhail  434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (“It is not surprising that the decision to 
marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, 
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. As the facts of this case illustrate, it would make 
little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with 
respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”). 
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between one man and one woman.142 Ironically, those who do not want civil 
unions recognized out of a desire to promote traditional marriage might well 
find that their policy choice will result in the celebration of many more same-sex 
marriages. This would be for several reasons: 
1. Same-sex individuals who are in a committed relationship might find 
the federal benefits accorded to marriage too good to resist. Thus, they might 
not find it sufficiently tempting to enter into a legal relationship, e.g., a civil 
union or domestic partnership, that is recognized by the state but not by the 
federal government. However, the benefits accrued by entering into a 
relationship recognized by both the state and the federal governments might be 
too valuable to refuse. 
2. Same-sex individuals who are in a committed relationship might be 
choosing between celebrating a civil union and celebrating a marriage. It might 
be, for example, that the state in which they live recognizes both civil unions 
and same-sex marriages.143 Or, it might be that the state permits civil unions to 
be celebrated locally but is also willing to recognize a same-sex marriage if 
validly celebrated in a sister state. In that event, with civil unions only receiving 
state recognition but same-sex marriages receiving both state and federal 
recognition, the couple might decide to forego the civil union and instead 
celebrate a marriage. 
3. While states cannot control what federal benefits will be conferred on a 
relationship, they can control which relationships will be recognized and which 
state benefits will be conferred on particular relationships. Those states wishing 
to afford equal treatment to same-sex and different-sex couples might have 
recognized civil unions rather than same-sex marriages out of a belief that doing 
so: (1) would be more politically palatable to those opposing same-sex unions, 
but (2) would not have deprived same-sex couples of any of the material 
benefits that they would have had if they had been able to marry.144 However, if 
the federal government recognizes same-sex marriages but not civil unions, then 
those states recognizing civil unions might feel added pressure to recognize 
same-sex marriages too. It could hardly be said that the state was affording 
equal treatment to same-sex couples domiciled in the state if those couples were 
in effect being denied the opportunity to enjoy the various federal benefits that 
are accorded to married couples. Thus, if the federal government were to 
recognize same-sex marriages but not civil unions, states that might otherwise 
have only recognized civil unions might now be induced to recognized same-sex 
 
 142. See generally, George W. Dent, Jr., Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 419 (2004). 
 143. See In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Brad Levenson . . . and Tony Sears 
have been partners for 15 years.  They registered their domestic partnership on March 16, 2000, and 
were married in California on July 12, 2008.”). 
 144. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (Supp. 2009) (“Parties to a civil union shall have all 
the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, 
administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to 
spouses in a marriage.”). 
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marriages either in addition to or instead of civil unions. The political gains 
afforded by offering a “separate but equal” status145 would be outweighed by 
the costs of imposing a separate and clearly unequal status. 
The point here is not, for example, that states recognizing same-sex 
marriage should refuse to recognize civil unions.146 There might be reasons that 
two individuals, whether of the same-sex or of different sexes, would prefer a 
civil union to a marriage, notwithstanding that federal benefits are associated 
with one and not the other.147 For example, individuals might lose particular 
benefits by (re)marrying, and they might want to have some legal recognition of 
their romantic relationship without marrying and losing the benefits that they 
otherwise would have.148 Indeed, whether the federal government decides to 
recognize same-sex marriage but not civil unions or both same-sex marriages 
and civil unions, states might try to create or maintain alternative statuses that 
promote the interests of the state while at the same time serving the needs of 
their domiciliaries.149 Thus, were civil unions treated as the equivalent of 
marriage for federal purposes (and benefits that might be lost by marrying 
would also be lost by entering into a civil union), states might decide to 
recognize domestic partnership or reciprocal beneficiary status.150 That way, 
they could induce individuals to have their relationships recognized, which 
might produce benefits for the individuals themselves and society as a whole. 
At the same time, however, some but by no means all of the rights and 
obligations of marriage would be associated with that differing status, thereby 
making clear that the status was not the equivalent of marriage for legal 
purposes. 
Were the federal-definition-of-marriage provision struck down or repealed, 
same-sex married couples would presumably be entitled to the same benefits 
that different-sex married couples receive. Yet, a number of other issues would 
have to be decided, e.g., whether other legally recognized relationships such as 
civil unions would also be entitled to benefits. Congress’s decision with respect 
to that would likely have many ramifications, including the possibility not only 
 
 145. A different issue is whether affording a separate and allegedly equal status would itself be 
viewed as stigmatizing. 
 146. For such an argument, see James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic 
Partnerships to Same-Sex Couples, 8 L. & SEX. 649, 669 (1998) (“[I]f same-sex marriage is finally 
achieved, again we should eliminate all domestic partnerships.”). 
 147. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Daniel I. Weiner, The Uncertain Future of Marriage and the Alternatives, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S 
L.J. 97, 105 n.36 (2007) (“The elderly, for instance, are more likely to be widowed and therefore 
precluded from remarrying if they want to keep various federal benefits.”). 
 149. Mark Strasser, The Future of Marriage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 87, 104-05 (2008) 
(“[S]tates could structure benefits in such a way as to take account of the existing needs and 
preferences of individuals while at the same time giving individuals some incentive to marry. States 
could and likely will create alternative structures that will not be the equivalent of marriage and will 
not have all of the benefits of marriage, but nonetheless will improve the lives of individuals who for 
whatever reason refuse to marry. Such programs might also have salutary effects for children living 
in such homes.”). 
 150. Cf. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-1 (LexisNexis 2005) (“The purpose of this chapter is to 
extend certain rights and benefits which are presently available only to married couples to couples 
composed of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying under state law.”). 
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that many more same-sex couples would marry but also that many more states 
would recognize same-sex marriage. 
B. Repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Provision 
The parade of horribles recounted by members of Congress when they 
feared that Hawaii would recognize same-sex marriage would not occur even 
were the DOMA full faith and credit provision repealed. Marriage itself would 
not suddenly disintegrate. Further, states would not suddenly be forced to 
recognize their domicilaries’ same-sex marriages celebrated in Massachusetts, 
Iowa, Connecticut, or Vermont during a weekend getaway. 
Historically, states prevented a variety of individuals from marrying each 
other, for example, those who were too young, too closely related by blood, or of 
different races.151 Sometimes, individuals who could not marry in their own 
domicile were not barred from marrying in a different state. Such individuals 
might travel across a state border, marry, and then hope to have their marriage 
recognized in their domicile. 
The first point to consider is that such marriages were not automatically 
recognized. Instead, the domicile would consider a variety of factors before 
deciding whether or not the union would be recognized.152 Basically, the 
question was not whether the marriage was against public policy—if the 
marriage was viewed as in accord with public policy then it would not have 
been prohibited in the first place. Rather, the question was whether the union 
violated an important public policy of the state. If so, then the domicile would 
refuse to recognize the marriage, notwithstanding its having been validly 
celebrated elsewhere.153 If the marriage did not violate an important public 
policy of the state, then it would be recognized, notwithstanding that it would 
not be celebrated within the state. 
Divorces, however, were a different matter. Assuming that they were 
granted by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, 
they would have to be given full faith and credit throughout the nation.154 Were 
this DOMA provision repealed or struck down, states would not have the power 
 
 151. See, e.g, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (A) (2007) (“Marriage between parents and children, 
including grandparents and grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and sisters of the one-
half as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews and between 
first cousins, is prohibited and void.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 301 (West 2004) (“An unmarried male of 
the age of 18 years or older, and an unmarried female of the age of 18 years or older, and not 
otherwise disqualified, are capable of consenting to and consummating marriage.”); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1967) (“Section 20-57 of the Virginia Code provides: “Marriages void 
without decree. All marriages between a white person and a colored person shall be absolutely void 
without any decree of divorce or other legal process.”). 
 152. For a discussion of the marriage recognition practices existing prior to DOMA, see generally 
Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It’s Due, 28 RUTGERS 
L.J. 313 (1997). 
 153. A separate question is whether one state could refuse to recognize a marriage validly 
celebrated in another domiciliary state, where the couple had not immediately planned on moving 
to a new domicile after the marriage.  See generally, for example, Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: 
On Subsequent Domiciles’ Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339 (1998). 
 154. Williams, 317 U.S. at 303. 
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to refuse to recognize a divorce judgment validly issued in another state. 
Further, rights arising from such a judgment would also have to be enforced. 
The repeal of this DOMA provision would not automatically render invalid 
the various mini-DOMAs that have been passed by the various states. Assuming 
no other federal guarantees are thereby violated, states can include within their 
own constitutions provisions that prohibit same-sex marriage, just as various 
states had constitutional provisions barring interracial marriage prior to Loving 
v. Virginia.155 However, a state constitutional provision that barred recognition 
of a judgment involving a same-sex marriage would be void. Without DOMA, 
there would be no arguable exception to the rule that divorce judgments validly 
issued in one state must be given full faith and credit in all of the states. 
Many state DOMAs not only preclude the recognition of same-sex 
marriage but also the recognition of same-sex divorces or any rights arising from 
the relationship.156 In such a state, part of its DOMA would be void. As to 
whether the entire Act would be void or just that part of it that violates full faith 
and credit guarantees, this would be a statutory interpretation question for the 
state supreme court—essentially, the question would be whether the provision 
barring the recognition of judgments was severable.157 
Even were the entire Act void, the state would not thereby be forced to 
recognize same-sex marriages. There might be other laws on the books 
precluding the celebration of such unions. Nonetheless, without a state DOMA 
on the books, it would be more difficult for a state court to refuse to credit a 
same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere, at least for some purposes. Further, 
were the state Defense of Marriage Act invalidated, there would no longer be a 
constitutional bar to the state’s recognizing same-sex marriages. The Legislature 
might pass such an act or, perhaps, a court might strike down the existing ban in 
light of state constitutional guarantees. 
Certainly, if a state Defense of Marriage Act were struck down on federal 
grounds, the Act might be passed again without the offending provision. 
However, prevailing attitudes toward same-sex marriage are changing,158 and it 
might be more difficult to pass a measure now than it was a mere decade ago. 
 
 155. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  The Loving Court mentioned various state constitutions including such a 
ban including the constitutions in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Tennessee.  See id. at 6 n.5. 
 156. For a description of the various types of state marriage amendments, see Mark Strasser, State 
Marriage Amendments and Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy, and Constitutional 
Limitations, 25 LAW & INEQ. 59 (2007). 
 157. Cf. Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community: Civil Lawsuits as the 
Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307, 353 n.230 (2009) (“As 
a general fundamental principle of construction, if a statute or contract contains a part that is invalid, 
unconstitutional, or against public policy and the invalid part may be severable from the rest, that 
invalid part should be stricken while the portion which is constitutional or unobjectionable may 
stand and be upheld by the court.”).  See also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 642 (1984) (“Whether 
an unconstitutional provision is severable from the remainder of a statute is largely a question of 
legislative intent, but the presumption is in favor of severability.”). 
 158. Adam Nagourney, Same-Sex Marriage Holds Peril for G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A15 
 (“The fact that a run of states have legalized same-sex marriage in recent months—either by court 
decision or by legislative action—with little backlash is only one indication of how public attitudes 
about this subject appear to be changing.”). 
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Even were it possible to pass the more limited measure again, that measure 
might not have some of the draconian effects that the existing measures are 
thought to have.159 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Defense of Marriage Act is constitutionally vulnerable, and one or both 
provisions may be struck down or repealed in the not-too-distant future. Were 
the Act repealed in its entirety, there would be a number of salutary effects—
same-sex married couples would be entitled to a large number of federal 
benefits to which they thus far have not been entitled. Further, individuals 
would not be able to avoid their court-imposed obligations by simply moving to 
a state that refused to enforce judgments arising from same-sex relationships. 
That said, however, even without DOMA, states could continue to refuse to 
recognize their domiciliaries’ same-sex marriages, absent a finding that such 
bans themselves violate constitutional guarantees. 
The above description of effects might also be accurate even were DOMA 
struck down rather than repealed. Thus, the full faith and credit provision might 
be struck down because Congress does not have the power to decrease the credit 
due to judgments and the federal definition provision might be struck down 
because no substantial interests could be articulated to justify the displacement 
of state law. Were these the bases for invalidation, DOMA’s unconstitutionality 
would seem to have few if any implications for the constitutionality of same-sex 
marriage bans. 
 Suppose, however, that DOMA were struck down for other reasons. 
Were the Court to suggest, for example, that the refusal to recognize same-sex 
marriage for federal purposes was animus-based and could not pass muster 
under rational basis review, that might have implications for state same-sex 
marriage bans—were the latter held to be animus-based, they too would 
presumably be struck down.160 
The Lawrence Court expressly refused to consider the constitutionality of 
same-sex marriage bans.161 Nonetheless, the Court struck down the Texas same-
sex sodomy ban, at least in part, because those sexual relations might be an 
element of an enduring relationship.162 Given the importance of such 
 
 159. Cf. State Constitutional Law—Same-Sex Relations—Supreme Court of Michigan Holds that Public 
Employers May Not Provide Healthcare Benefits to Same-Sex Domestic Partners of Employees—National 
Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 
1263 (2009) (“Recently, in National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, the Supreme Court of 
Michigan undertook such an interpretive exercise and held that the state’s marriage amendment 
prohibits public employers from providing healthcare benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of 
their employees.”). 
 160. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“[T]he amendment seems inexplicable by 
anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state 
interests.”). 
 161. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578  (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter.”). 
 162. See id. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another 
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”). 
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relationships to the adults themselves and to any children that they might be 
raising, and the lack of substantial or, arguably, even legitimate state interests to 
support such bans, the existing jurisprudence would seem to require the 
invalidation of same-sex marriage bans.163 
Yet, even if the current jurisprudence suggests that same-sex marriage bans 
violate federal constitutional guarantees, two points might be emphasized: (1) 
the unconstitutionality of such bans does not depend upon the presence or 
absence of DOMA, and (2) as Justice Scalia seems to have recognized, the lack of 
a constitutional basis to uphold such bans164 does not necessitate their being 
struck down, given the Court’s willingness to ignore principle and logic in this 
area of the law.165 
 
 
 163. See generally Mark Strasser, Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage Bans: On Constitutional 
Interpretation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2004). 
 164. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion dismantles the 
structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and 
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”). 
 165. Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case [Lawrence] ‘does not involve’ the issue of 
homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do 
with the decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is 
so.”). 
